Chinese Lunar New Year (chunjie, 春节) is one of the most important festivals in the Chinese calendar that starts on the new moon in the lunar cycle – between the 21st of January and the 20thof February each year. In 2019, the lunar new year starts on the 5thof February, and it marks the beginning of the Year of the Pig.
The pig, which is named after the five elements- Metal, Water, Wood, Fire and Earth- is the last of the twelve zodiac animals and symbolises kindness and generosity. According to zodiac legend, the Jade Emperor threw a big party and decided that the order of the animals would be defined by their arrival to his party. The pig was late because it overslept, and so it became the last of all the animals in the zodiac.
The history of Lunar New Year started when ancient Chinese agrarian society counted the cycles of seasons from their planting experience, and the yearly celebration emerged with the creation of the calendar during the Shang Dynasty. The worshiping activities from this period form the current way the festival is celebrated, which include gifting food, clothes and harvest to the ancestors for blessings and peace at the end of each year. Other traditions are hanging red signs with the Chinese character fu, 福(“happiness”) on front doors along with red lanterns.
The Lunar New Year is one of the world’s most celebrated festivals taking place in countries such as Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Cambodia. The New Year celebrations also results in the largest annual mass human migration in the world. As per the official estimate, the number of trips during chunyunin 2019 is expected to be 0.6 percent higher than 2018, with almost three billion trips to be made between January 21stand March 1st. According to Xinhua News Agency, to account for this mass travel period, China launched 10 new railways at the end of 2018 along with facial recognition software and ticket-less travel systems “to ease congestion and improve passenger movement at train stations.” (Gupta, 2019).
To all readers of the Confucian Weekly Bulletin, we wish you New Year happiness! (Xinnian kuaile, 新年快乐) for 2019.
Although mass tourism is one of the most lucrative industries in the world due to the growing competition between destinations, and the major source of foreign exchange earnings that tourism gives to countries, increasingly critics have pointed to tourism’s negative social, economic, cultural, and environmental impacts. For example, by overusing scarce water and land resources and failing to regulate rapid population growth in already congested areas, locals in Venice and Barcelona have held anti-tourist protests in the past years calling for a cap on tourist numbers (Kettle, The Guardian, 2017). This has led to a call for alternative forms of tourism such as ‘cultural tourism’. As Scott (1997) noted, the reason for this shift from mass to cultural tourism is that capitalism has moved into a phase “in which the cultural forms and meanings of its outputs become critical if not dominating elements of productive strategy” (p. 323). In other words, the commodification of culture’s material and symbolic resources provides a highly mobile and arguably infinite form of capital supply.
On the one hand, this model can be considered to be attractive to some local communities. Van der duim, Peters, and Akama’s (2005) study on cultural tourism in African communities reveals that host communities cannot always be seen as victims to predetermined global development processes of mass tourism. Through the initiation of various cultural tourism activities, groups like the Maasai people in Kenya and Tanzania have acted as agents with power to influence tourism projects that have become a key source of livelihood for their communities. These observations reveal that the power dynamics of cultural tourism are not a one-way flow as they often are with mass tourism, and shared power dynamic is reflected by the negotiations that often take place between tour guides and local representatives, as well as between tourists and locals when it comes to buying souvenirs or hosting tourist families.
For governments too, the cultural tourism model is an attractive alternative to the negative reputation and impact of mass tourism since cultural tourism can easily be tied to the idea of a national ‘brand’. In India, cultural tourism was the main push behind the rise of the tourism sector, with the promotion of India as a land of ancient history and culture in the 2002 Incredible India!campaign. Since launching the campaign, India improved its travel and tourism competitiveness by increasing its position from 65thof 40thin The Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Report 2017 (World Economic Forum, 2017, p. 4). However, as Reena Gupta (2018) noted in her analysis of the Incredible India!campaign, the use of cultural tourism as national branding has become more of a reflection of an imagined identity rather than reality itself. In some of the most recent Incredible India!advertisements, Indians are not fully present on screen as when they are shown, they mostly represent unknown characters whose purpose is to welcome and dance for the western woman at the centre of the tourist story. Therefore, even in the cultural tourist setting where a place’s history, landscape, and people should take centre stage, ethnicity and culture is presented as the “seasoning that can liven up the dull dish that is mainstream white culture” (hooks, 1992, p. 424). In other words, the cultures that are being shown and projected are not neutral: they are related to how governments and the global tourist market construct and understand a place, and the packaging of this is aimed towards a particular western (but increasingly, growing middle class, eastern) market.
This raises the question about who owns and is able to access culture. In his analysis on cultural politics and tourism, Jim Butcher (2005) states that museums, galleries, and heritage sites are often “regulated through state culture policy, policy that is very much the product of a wider contested cultural politics” (p. 21). This contestation plays out between marginalised and dominant groups in society, and it is usually the case where the dominated group either directly or indirectly fights against or accepts the dominant group’s historical narrative as the natural state of the world. For instance, in Western Europe, the history of state socialism has been externalised to the current neo-liberal socio-economic model, where most museums in former Soviet countries have been revamped to the extent that the nuances (and sometimes positive experiences) of life under communism are rarely shown (Molden, 2016, p. 126). Although pro-communist, pro-Soviet groups still exist throughout Europe, especially in Eastern European countries, it is rare that the positive experiences of Soviet times will be shared in official cultural tourism sites.
In that case, there is always a connection between cultural experience and the structural context of power relations, especially between those who want to maintain or change the dominant cultural framework and those that just passively live in it. The dominant group establishes this reality through the creation of a distinct language and symbolic imagery that legitimizes the mainstream cultural framework which cultural tourism programs operate in. With India, the fantasy created by the ministry of tourism and culture is that Westerners and upper-class Indians, particularly the diaspora, can consume Indian things without needing to deal with the agency and potential resistance from working-class Indian people, who are increasingly being overworked (Gill, 2018). This represents a form of “internal orientalism” since Indians themselves depict their country as “a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences” (Said, 1970, p. 9) within the framework of tourist capitalism.
In China, a similar phenomenon is occurring. The celebration and promotion of China’s “Confucian renaissance” is marked by the emergence of the upscale Confucian-themed Nishan Akademia hotel in Qufu, the birthplace of Confucius. Opened in 2016, guests can dress up in traditional Hanfu clothing from the Han dynasty, similar to those featured in Chinese television dramas. Once robed, activities offered to the guests include practicing calligraphy, playing traditional games including touhou, and visiting the Confucius museum. Accommodation at Nishan Akademia includes 47 stand-alone houses, some of which cost more than 10,000 yuan (US$1,440) a night (Yau, SCMP, 2018). These representations, marketed at wealthy Chinese and Western audiences, show a very uncritical, uncontroversial side of Confucianism that fits properly into the (national) master narrative of China’s history and culture.
Beyond Shandong province, China’s cultural tourism is also marketed around the commodification of various “exotic” minority (minzu) cultures. The term minzu, roughly translated as minority or ethnic group, is a political classification that includes the Han Chinese majority and the 55 officially recognised ethnic minority groups throughout China. While all these groups are defined by a common language, territory, and economy, belonging to the greater category of zhonghua minzu (pan-Chinese national identity), non-Han ethnic minorities are both the object of exoticism and fear, which makes them suitable marketable products for cultural tourism. Swain (1990) writes that most of China’s minority groups live in regions that have important natural resources and are on strategic international borders, and that domestic tourists are encouraged to visit these areas for the scenery and to observe the ‘curious’ indigenous people. A China Reconstructs(May 1988) article describes the difference in park accommodations in Tibet between the three state guest houses and the small inns run by Tibetan families, where the inns facilities are described as “limited, but the experience is unique”. Indigenous groups in these areas often become a generic category, marked only by their distinct traditional clothes. In Hainan island, where the centre is being developed for cultural tourism, hotels, minority restaurants, and tours into Wuzhi mountain minority villages feature minority women as hostesses for guests, which is part of the larger “primitive” package that tourists are promised. In the article, “Hawaii of the Other” (Bier, 1998), a researcher is quoted as saying that development in Hainan Island is for show. Away from the tourist sites, “the central government is not providing money to improve standards of living”. A similar finding was also noted by associate professor Trine Brox (2017), who conducted a mixed qualitative and quantitative study on the biggest minzumarket in Chengdu and found that although sold as Tibetan cultural products, many of the shops sold goods not made in Tibet or by Tibetans and most of the shops were not run by Tibetans themselves.
There is also a sexual and gendered factor in China’s cultural tourism. In many mass media images, indigenous girls and women appear next to or communing with animals, picking fruits, and standing near waterfalls and streams. Their carefree nature is depicted by them laughing and they are dressed in decorative costumes that help identify them with their nationality. While the elaborateness of their clothing is associated with adulthood, these women are often featured with physical features of a child, linking nativity to innocence and naivety. The effect is that these women are infantilized and made to be the object of fascination. In the article Gender and Internal Orientalism in China, Schein (1997) highlights that these imaginings made minority women a powerful attraction. Also associated with repulsion and fear along with desire, it was not uncommon to be told by a Chinese urbanite that women “there” do not cover their breasts, or that young indigenous people engage in “socially sanctioned orgies” (p. 77). The idea is that the eroticised ‘other’ is placed into the social imaginary as being both dangerous and alluring, especially for upper-class city people.
Although there can be a difference between mass tourism from other, most focused forms of tourism such as cultural tourism – which can promote economic development for indigenous groups if these groups are in charge of the decision-making and owning the processes of promoting cultural continuity (Swain, 1990) – in China, the unequal power dynamics between ethnic groups, the central government, and tourist capitalism creates a rather complex picture. It is the state which defines who and what constitutes an ethnic group and the tourist market that defines who is or will be an upcoming cultural commodity. While there are definite economic benefits in promoting cultural tourism, including stimulating the national economy and attracting foreign capital, it is questionable whether these profits flow back into the ethnic communities whose cultural products are being marketed, and whether the cultural picture that is being packaged for tourists is authentic or part of the imagined cultural tourism experience.
By Cindy Minarova-Banjac
Part 10 of the 2018 interview with Dr. Alan Chan at Bond University, Australia. Dr. Alan Chan discusses his book ‘Analects Renovated’, which is a diluted and applicable version of the Analects in modern times.
While most of the literature on Confucianism focuses on the application of Confucian philosophy in China, little attention has been paid to the development of Confucianism in Korea and Japan. One Religion, Two Countries: Classical and Neo-Confucianism in Korea and Japan with Dr. John Goulde explores the different adaptions of Confucianism to Japan and Korea’s bureaucratic, government and educational institutions.
The Serpentine Pavilion Beijing in China is the galley’s first feature outside of the UK. Serpentine Galleries partnered with Chinese architecture company WF Central to co-commission the structure that is located 600 metres from the Forbidden City at the WF Central site. Comprising of 38 steel rods that curve like an archer’s bow, the building is held by cables stretched between steel plates.
According to the Serpentine Pavilion Beijing announcement, the building was built to have a focus on “society, community and a respect for local context and vernacular craftsmenship.” Furthermore, it “aims to address contemporary architectural issues with a sense of realism, an approach inspired by folk wisdom.” In that sense, the design “takes inspiration from Confucianism with an architecture that is a physical representation of the traditional pursuit of Junzi,” loosely defined as a moral exemplar. The “pavilion’s integral structure aims – like a Tai Chi master – to conquer the harshness of [the external forces of fierce winds and unpredictable earthquakes] with softness.” The archer figure, in the form of a curved cantilever beam that incorporates the forces of elasticity through cables stretched between steel plates, has long been related to military skill, and good political governance in Chinese philosophy while bow metaphors are used in The Analects to highlight practices of morality.
For chief architect at Jiakun Architects, Liu Jiakun, what the project “ultimately wanted to present is a spatial installation that goes beyond mere function to push the boundaries of contemporary architectural practice.”
The Serpentine Pavilion Beijing is now a featured public space for cultural activities, events and social encounters, with a programme of cultural activities programmed across five Pavilion Weekends over the summer.
In the last ten years, China has begun transitioning to a lower greenhouse economy in an attempt to fix widespread environmental destruction that resulted from policies that prioritised quick economic growth over nature conservation. To achieve this goal of creating what president Xi Jinping called an “ecological civilisation”, China faces the challenge of balancing industrialisation and community well-being with environmental protection through reform programs. These programs are based on the Confucian principle of maintaining harmony between social production and the environment by, for example, protecting natural resource rights; establishing better systems for protecting arable land and water; and creating a green financing system (Chun, 2015). The government has also proposed conducting natural resource audits when officials leave their posts so that there will be an incentive to consider environmental impacts since one will be held accountable for any damage during their time in office. Regular audits are already being carried out in locations such as Hulunbuir, Inner Mongolia.
According to Dr. Heidi Wang-Kaeding (2018) from Trinity College Dublin, with the idea of “ecological civilisation” China seeks to become a global leader in climate change cooperation and support its economy by developing its own renewable energy sector. Strategically, the push for energy transformation makes sense. For one, China remains the world’s second largest energy-consuming country after the United States, and coal accounts for more than 75 percent of total commercial energy use (International Energy Agency, 2018). This not only makes China dependent on countries that it imports coal from, but it also increases environmental risks as poor mining practices lead to large-scale solid waste, water and land contamination, and increased methane emissions. Secondly, becoming a leader in sustainability means that other countries that lack technological capacity and resources will rely on Chinese expertise to show them how to adopt alternative energy practices. It allows China to become an even more important partner when countries deal with present and future challenges as they will be inclined to reach out to China for assistance and investment. Finally, although “ecological civilisation” was primarily aimed at domestic audiences as the Communist Party sought to promote the idea that an environmentally friendly future has its base in an authoritarian one-party system, the concept also signals to the outside world that China is shaping the existing rule-based order in its own way (Xinhua, 2017). For the government, the ‘Chinese way’ means to look to its Confucian and socialist traditions to introduce eco-friendly policies that are grounded in commercial production. As President Xi stated in 2017, “clear waters and green mountains are as valuable as mountains of gold and silver” (lushui qingshan jiushi jinshan yinshan). In other words, environmental and commercial development should go hand in hand and are not necessarily conflicting concepts.
Although in the past, the United States was seen as the ‘leader of the free world’ and protector of human rights, America is now becoming one of the greatest obstacles to world peace and cooperation, according to Chinese officials. The delay of signing the Kyoto Protocol and exiting out of the Paris Climate Accord exacerbates the global warming problem significantly since increases of greenhouse gases in America, especially carbon dioxide, over the last few years is fuelling global warming at a significant rate. Consequently, the rise of global governance in China signifies that the country could step up to the opportunity of becoming a new global environmental leader.
In a recent report, it was highlighted that China’s domestic environmental policies were making clear positive impacts. As Gretchen Daily, professor of environmental science at Stanford notes: “In the face of deepening environmental crisis, China has become very ambitious and innovative in its new conservation science and policies and has implemented them on a breathtaking scale.” For instance, by enacting policies and funding software that monitor environmental areas that should be protected or restored, concentrations of PM2.5, the tiny particles that indicate the level of air pollution, decreased by 40 percent in 2017 from 2013 levels in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region. Considering that high levels of PM2.5 were responsible for the deaths of more than 5.5 million people who contracted diseases relating to air pollution, the World Bank stated that economic loss for high air pollution has been about US$5 trillion annually since 2013. Moreover, following the progress of the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) campaign in 2016, local government have also been active in closing illegal mines and unlicensed hydropower plants in Gansu Province while increasing monitoring of sewage treatment plants. Although mining in general is a significant part of China’s economic expansion, the far western Xinjiang region suspended mining in one of its biggest natural reserves. The official Xinhua news agency reported that poor regulation and a lack of enforcement standards led to soil contamination, making parts of land and water supplies unfit for human use, potentially threatening public health. All up, 69 mining projects in Xinjiang’s Altun national reserve were stopped and mining activities within the reserve, which also threatened endangered species such as Tibetan wild yak and donkey, were banned.
The introduction of the Environmental Protection Tax Law since the 1st of January, 2018 was another way of providing companies with a reason to cut emissions and improve production technology since businesses were being fined based on the amount of pollutants they discharged each year. After being the first company to get a tax reduction for having lower pollution discharge than China’s national standard for the chemical sector, a financial representative from BASF Application Chemical Co. released a statement highlighting that the company will continue to “optimize our manufacturing techniques to reduce pollution.” All around China, over 260,000 companies, public institutions, and business operators were required to pay environmental tax. Such initiatives show that through funding, improved technologies and tight policies, China is making environmentally sustainable outcomes in the short-term.
For some analysts, these results even have the potential to produce positive developments in less-developed countries under the Belt and Road Initiative. Gianluca Ghiara, the national vice chair of Environment Working Group at the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China stated that the Belt and Road Initiative was an attractive opportunity for African countries who could gain from enhanced cooperation in areas that promote ecological and inclusive development. The idea is that China will use its growing experience in transitioning towards being a green energy source country in the infrastructure developments it is setting up along the Belt and Road. However, loan recipient countries should not assume that the infrastructure and technology from China will create a rosy economic future for their economies. Some of the projects along the Belt and Road have the potential to drain local resources and produce infrastructure deficits that have little benefit to surrounding communities (Arewa, 2016). As Biswas and Hartley (2017) argue, so far the Belt and Road Initiative “may grab headlines but it is no panacea.” For instance, at present Sri Lanka is unable to pay back debts to Chinese banks for largely unused ports, airports, and highways. The Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport in Southeast Sri Lanka was designed to handle one million passengers every year but now currently deals with 12 passengers per day or less than one percent of the original projections that cost the country US$210 million.
Environmental issues are also of concern. Even though President Xi declared that the Belt and Road Initiative development would be “green, low-carbon, circular and sustainable”, a significant amount of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor investment is powered by coal-fired power plants. In Bangladesh, concerns about pollution led to violent protests in 2016 against the coal-fired power plant that was constructed by Chinese firms. Professor William Laurance, a James Cook University researcher even warned that China’s trillion-dollar infrastructure program is the “riskiest environmental project in human history” as over 1,700 critical biodiversity areas will be impacted by Chinese funded projects for roads, oil and gas pipelines, and hydroelectric dams. Although China has claimed that the Belt and Road will be distinguished by its sustainability portfolio, there have been many examples of exploitative Chinese firms going into developing nations who are unable to enforce and monitor environmental standards. On the one hand, it may seem that China is doing a much better job at improving its environment domestically than through its international interactions, but a publicly released national inspection found that environmental protection in areas like Tibet did not meet the requirements of the central government and public. In the Tibet case, more than 240 rural road projects were started without environmental protection approval, and a majority of scenic spots did not have sewage treatment facilities. In addition, management of hazardous solid waste was problematic as more than 6,000 officials were held accountable for environmental damage, according to the region’s Ministry of Environmental Protection.
Using Confucianism’s principle of harmony to underpin efforts to protect the environment has had only a minor impact and much of this Confucian rhetoric is used to appeal to the public. Improper afforestation in China’s drylands, for instance, was designed by some local governments as a response to growing concerns about the region’s tree felling. This project resulted in more environmental degradation in the area. Such mistakes show that long-term environmental protection involves coordination and supervision of environmental protection bureaus as well as increased engagement with the science community. Relying on short-term successes and quick profits could negatively affect China’s economy and reputation by undermining both its domestic and international initiatives.
The mass devastation and environmental destruction that has resulted from the devaluation of nature in today’s capitalist economy can be considered one of the major security issues in the twenty-first century. As scholar and activist Dr. Vandana Shiva (2014) points out, ‘Nature has been subjugated to the market as a mere supplier of industrial raw material and dumping ground for waste and pollution’ (p. 14). The push by governments and corporations to unrestrictedly consume in order to develop a strong market has led to mass-scale desertification and wastage, where consumers in industrialized countries waste almost as much food as the entire net food production of sub-Saharan Africa on a yearly basis (222 million vs. 230 million tons). The United Nations Food and Agricultural report (2017) found that as one-third of the food produced for human consumption (about 1.3 billion tons) gets lost or wasted every year, uneven demographic pressures and changes in food demand in developing countries means that billions of people still face the threat of hunger, poverty, joblessness, and environmental degradation from unsustainable agricultural practices.
The monoculture system, for example, which involves growing single crops such as corn and soybeans intensively and on a vast scale, relies heavily on chemical inputs like synthetic pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2016). Currently, there is an ongoing investigation on agro-chemical company Monsanto as more than 400 lawsuits were filed in the U.S. District Court in San Francisco by people alleging that exposure to Roundup herbicide, most commonly used for monoculture crops, was the cause of large-scale cases of non-Hodgkin lymphoma. The World Health Organization’s International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) concluded in 2015 that the herbicide was “probably carcinogenic”. With the high growth rate of the human population meaning that feeding humanity will require at least a 50 percent increase in the production of food and other agricultural products by the middle of the century, the Monsanto case (and others- see Rifai, 2017) shows that there is still a lack of environmentally sustainable approaches and technologies to facilitate farm mechanization and the large-scale extension of agricultural systems.
In China, rapid economic growth over the past three decades has resulted in extreme environmental hardships around the country. For example, two-thirds of China’s 656 cities suffer domestic and industrial water shortages (Cao et al., 2013). Moreover, China is believed to have 16 of the world’s 20 cities with the worst air pollution and the world’s highest rate of chronic respiratory disease with a mortality rate five times that of the United States (Liu & Diamond, 2008, p. 37-38). Air pollution is estimated to contribute to about 750,000 premature deaths every year, and more than half of China’s cities are reported to be affected by acid rain (Zhang & Smith, 2002). These figures show that the Market Paradigm and the open door policies adopted by Chinese officials and corporations in their attempts to maximise wealth has been detrimental for the country’s health and environment. With the Western individualism model, which is based on the reason over nature hierarchy and the repression of the female/maternal, being inadequate to address these problems, there have been arguments that the country needs to restore environmental equilibrium through indigenous teachings and philosophies (Lindsay, 2012).
One of the proposed alternative approaches to environmental governance is based on Confucian teachings. According to this perspective, Confucianism can help China transform the country’s relationship with the environment by promoting an attitude towards nature that teaches people how to tend, cultivate, and reshape nature in order to bring about social flourishing. By the widespread adoption of such views, it is believed that those in power will be increasingly pressured to abide by environmental laws and approach policy decision-making in a way that serves both human and environmental development. The internalising of principles such as ren (仁, “benevolence”) and zhengming (正名, “reification of names”) can help to establish this. Jan Eric Christensen (2014) explains that the concept of zhengming, which involves calling things by their proper names and dealing with reality, is concerned with being aware and reflecting on one’s moral values. The method for this practice is to “recognize the meaning of the individual within the social group and within the natural universe” (p. 287). In other words, to practice zhengming is to acknowledge the role that individuals play in both the social and natural worlds. Thus, while nature is recognised to be a resource for human needs and survival, just like the rules and norms around social interaction, the use of nature is believed to be set within particular normative and cosmic constraints. The Doctrine of the Mean highlights the Confucian conception of the human-nature relationship and the duty that humans have towards nature in chapter 22. It states,
Only those who are absolutely sincere can fully develop their nature. If they can fully develop their nature, they can fully develop the nature of others. If they can fully develop the nature of others, they can fully develop the nature of things. If they can fully develop the nature of things, they can assist in the transforming and nourishing process of Heaven and Earth. If they can assist in the transforming and nourishing process of Heaven and Earth, they can thus form a trinity with Heaven and Earth.
The passage suggests that to act sincerely and authentically is to act in accordance with our moral intelligence, which means to promote the wellbeing and flourishing of others and other species. This principle requires that every person develops the responsibility of nourishing the Heaven and Earth to be able to strive and live a life with compassion and dignity.
However, with the commodity economy resulting in people over-purchasing their food, an ecological imbalance occurs as growth in supply leads to more pollution and chemical wastage. In principle, the rules around food consumption in Chinese culture are about balancing the need to access the necessary nutrition for sustaining life and maintaining health and well-being. In the Analects, it is written that Confucius “did not eat rice that had gone sour or fish and meat that had spoiled. He did not eat food that had gone off colour or food that had a bad smell. He did not eat food that was not properly prepared, nor did he eat except at the proper times” (10.7). Such passages use Confucius as a model to convey rules about consumption and dining, illustrating a standard of moderation and the importance of dietary safety. The underlying message is that food and drinks should be consumed in moderation. When describing an exemplary or morally superior individual, the Analects notes that when drinking alcohol, Junzi people are able to hold their drink (9.16). As for Confucius, “even when there was plenty of meat, he avoided eating more meat than rice” and he “did not eat more than was proper” (10.8). The implication is that all human activities, including the most basic such as food consumption, are inseparable from the problems of value and consistency. So, by exercising righteous and proper behaviour, which involves practising constraint, can one come to an ideal state of zhonge (中和), which often translates to ‘equilibrium and harmony’. Once this is realised to the highest degree, it is believed Heaven and Earth “attain their proper order and all things will flourish’ (Chan, 1963, p. 98).
The need to exercise restraint when using the environment to attain resources and promote human prosperity is further discussed in the text Mengzi. Here it is stated that there was a time when the trees were luxuriant on the Ox Mountain but by being situated on the outskirts of a growing settlement, the trees were being constantly chopped down, so “Is it any wonder that they are no longer fine?” (Mencius 6A.8). Although this passage is used to compare the nature of humans as having a predisposition towards humanity and righteousness just as a lush mountain tends to restore itself over time, the description of the barren mountain as being the consequence of human activity shows that the early Confucians were aware of the impact that human settlement had on the environment. For Confucius, the way to avoid environmental destruction was to regulate such interaction. For instance, when fishing it was preferable to use a fishing line and not a cable with many lines attached to it, and when shooting birds to avoid shooting the roosting ones (Analects, 7.27). By not excessively extracting from the environment, the natural world would be able to recover and develop itself back to the ideal state of zhonge.
The theory that humans should dominate and conquer the natural world was never part of mainstream thinking in classical China. Despite this, the question remains as to how Confucian environmental principles can be put into practice in the modern world. More specifically, how should China, who claims to be an “ecological civilisation”, apply Confucian environmental ethics to its economic policies without harming the country’s growth? The third part of this sustainability series will provide a critical overview of China’s recent environmental projects and examine whether the application of Confucian principles is adequate to transform human-environment interaction.