One of the more arresting claims Aristotle makes in his famous exploration of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics is that you can’t be friends with god. His reasoning is that friendship requires equality, and the gods are vastly superior to us. The argument is a plausible one: it seems difficult or impossible to be friends with a boss, mentor, or teacher in quite the way that one is friends with one’s peers and equals. Indeed we might say that friendship is distinctive precisely in being non-hierarchical. If I am truly your friend, what I am to you is exactly what you are to me.
This thought has been supposed to cause trouble for the followers of Confucius. Confucianism was China’s most influential philosophical tradition for well over two millennia. Its ethical teaching has at its center several hierarchical relationships that were intrinsically bound up with forms of propriety, including rituals. The second most famous Confucian thinker Mencius (372-289 BC) identifies five ‘cardinal relations’, four of which are clearly hierarchical: ruler and subject, father and son, old and young, and husband and wife (Aristotle too sees the latter as an unequal relationship). The odd relationship out is friendship. Friendship seems to fit badly with the Confucian idea of modeling human relationships on family bonds. One possible comparison, which sees friends as having a bond like that between older and younger brother, would not secure the symmetry we’re looking for. Friendship is also anomalous among the cardinal relations in lacking ritual prescriptions, and in being voluntary. You don’t choose your father or (at least in ancient China) your ruler, but you do choose your friends.
Confucius (551-479 BC) would also have had some reason to think that friendships should be unequal. For him the purpose of friendship is the cultivation of virtue. It seems a natural thought that we should therefore befriend those more excellent than us, so as to learn from them. Yet like Aristotle, Confucius insists on symmetry in true friendship, advising, “do not have as a friend anyone who is not as good as you are.”
It’s been argued that in light of this latter rule, Confucius himself could never have made friends at all. His disciples were certainly dear to him, as we see from a passage in his Analects, when he openly grieves for one of them who has died. But does that mean he was this disciple’s friend? David Hall and Roger Ames would say not. In their book Thinking Through Confucius, they asserted, “Confucius is peerless and hence, friendless. To assert that Confucius had friends would diminish him.” His relation with his students was arguably more akin to a hierarchical, familial one, as shown by the fact that he referred to them as his xiaozi, meaning ‘little masters’, or ‘sons’.
In keeping with the equality of friendship, Confucius identifies trust (xin) as its distinctive attitude, whereas a familial relationship would be characterized by an asymmetrical virtue such as filial piety (xiao). Confucius would thus discourage parents from trying to befriend their children, a common trend in modern-day family life. Just as a father cannot be the teacher of his son because their relation is too intimate, so being overly familiar is no way to be familial.
But how exactly do I cultivate excellence by befriending someone who is equal to me? After all it would seem that I have nothing to learn from my moral peer, at least not in the way Confucius describes in this passage from the Analects: “in strolling in the company of just two other persons, I am bound to find a teacher. Identifying their strengths, I follow them, and identifying their weaknesses, I reform myself accordingly.” Instead, it must somehow be that sharing with equal others in the excellent moral life, or at least in the pursuit of virtue, is itself a spur to the good life, or even a constitutive part of it.
Confucius seems to have been convinced that this is so. For one thing, no less than other relationships, friendship gives us an opportunity to exercise virtue. Confucius himself aimed “to bring peace to the old, to have trust in my friends, and to cherish the young,” and in advising us on examining our own character he speaks of reflecting on whether we have always kept our word with our friends. Friendship is also a source of delight, as is made clear in this line from the opening passage of the Analects: “to have friends [peng] come from distant quarters: is this not a source of enjoyment?” Yanguo He informs us that the word peng has a strong implication of ‘like-mindedness’, and may especially indicate the bonds between the students gathered around one master.
This is a hint towards a deeper importance of friends, namely that they are embarked with us upon a joint project of self-cultivation. We do not improve morally by looking to friends as a model for imitation, as we might with a superior. Rather, our affection for them is based on a recognition that they share with us our greatest pursuit. To illustrate this idea, the scholar Xiufen Lu gave the example of the tale of Bo Ya, a musician whose mastery was fully appreciated only by his friend Zhong Ziqi. When Zhong died, Bo Ya smashed his instrument, on the grounds that playing without being understood is pointless.
Likewise, Confucius occasionally complained about being unappreciated by the morally inept. This may come as a surprise, but is simply the counterpart of the joy he took in associating with those who shared his values. Birds of a feather really do flock together, ideally by taking wing towards the heights of virtue.
© Prof. Peter Adamson 2018
Peter Adamson is the author of A History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps, Vols 1, 2 & 3, available from OUP. They’re based on his popular History of Philosophy podcast.
*This original article can be found here.
The mass devastation and environmental destruction that has resulted from the devaluation of nature in today’s capitalist economy can be considered one of the major security issues in the twenty-first century. As scholar and activist Dr. Vandana Shiva (2014) points out, ‘Nature has been subjugated to the market as a mere supplier of industrial raw material and dumping ground for waste and pollution’ (p. 14). The push by governments and corporations to unrestrictedly consume in order to develop a strong market has led to mass-scale desertification and wastage, where consumers in industrialized countries waste almost as much food as the entire net food production of sub-Saharan Africa on a yearly basis (222 million vs. 230 million tons). The United Nations Food and Agricultural report (2017) found that as one-third of the food produced for human consumption (about 1.3 billion tons) gets lost or wasted every year, uneven demographic pressures and changes in food demand in developing countries means that billions of people still face the threat of hunger, poverty, joblessness, and environmental degradation from unsustainable agricultural practices.
The monoculture system, for example, which involves growing single crops such as corn and soybeans intensively and on a vast scale, relies heavily on chemical inputs like synthetic pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2016). Currently, there is an ongoing investigation on agro-chemical company Monsanto as more than 400 lawsuits were filed in the U.S. District Court in San Francisco by people alleging that exposure to Roundup herbicide, most commonly used for monoculture crops, was the cause of large-scale cases of non-Hodgkin lymphoma. The World Health Organization’s International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) concluded in 2015 that the herbicide was “probably carcinogenic”. With the high growth rate of the human population meaning that feeding humanity will require at least a 50 percent increase in the production of food and other agricultural products by the middle of the century, the Monsanto case (and others- see Rifai, 2017) shows that there is still a lack of environmentally sustainable approaches and technologies to facilitate farm mechanization and the large-scale extension of agricultural systems.
In China, rapid economic growth over the past three decades has resulted in extreme environmental hardships around the country. For example, two-thirds of China’s 656 cities suffer domestic and industrial water shortages (Cao et al., 2013). Moreover, China is believed to have 16 of the world’s 20 cities with the worst air pollution and the world’s highest rate of chronic respiratory disease with a mortality rate five times that of the United States (Liu & Diamond, 2008, p. 37-38). Air pollution is estimated to contribute to about 750,000 premature deaths every year, and more than half of China’s cities are reported to be affected by acid rain (Zhang & Smith, 2002). These figures show that the Market Paradigm and the open door policies adopted by Chinese officials and corporations in their attempts to maximise wealth has been detrimental for the country’s health and environment. With the Western individualism model, which is based on the reason over nature hierarchy and the repression of the female/maternal, being inadequate to address these problems, there have been arguments that the country needs to restore environmental equilibrium through indigenous teachings and philosophies (Lindsay, 2012).
One of the proposed alternative approaches to environmental governance is based on Confucian teachings. According to this perspective, Confucianism can help China transform the country’s relationship with the environment by promoting an attitude towards nature that teaches people how to tend, cultivate, and reshape nature in order to bring about social flourishing. By the widespread adoption of such views, it is believed that those in power will be increasingly pressured to abide by environmental laws and approach policy decision-making in a way that serves both human and environmental development. The internalising of principles such as ren (仁, “benevolence”) and zhengming (正名, “reification of names”) can help to establish this. Jan Eric Christensen (2014) explains that the concept of zhengming, which involves calling things by their proper names and dealing with reality, is concerned with being aware and reflecting on one’s moral values. The method for this practice is to “recognize the meaning of the individual within the social group and within the natural universe” (p. 287). In other words, to practice zhengming is to acknowledge the role that individuals play in both the social and natural worlds. Thus, while nature is recognised to be a resource for human needs and survival, just like the rules and norms around social interaction, the use of nature is believed to be set within particular normative and cosmic constraints. The Doctrine of the Mean highlights the Confucian conception of the human-nature relationship and the duty that humans have towards nature in chapter 22. It states,
Only those who are absolutely sincere can fully develop their nature. If they can fully develop their nature, they can fully develop the nature of others. If they can fully develop the nature of others, they can fully develop the nature of things. If they can fully develop the nature of things, they can assist in the transforming and nourishing process of Heaven and Earth. If they can assist in the transforming and nourishing process of Heaven and Earth, they can thus form a trinity with Heaven and Earth.
The passage suggests that to act sincerely and authentically is to act in accordance with our moral intelligence, which means to promote the wellbeing and flourishing of others and other species. This principle requires that every person develops the responsibility of nourishing the Heaven and Earth to be able to strive and live a life with compassion and dignity.
However, with the commodity economy resulting in people over-purchasing their food, an ecological imbalance occurs as growth in supply leads to more pollution and chemical wastage. In principle, the rules around food consumption in Chinese culture are about balancing the need to access the necessary nutrition for sustaining life and maintaining health and well-being. In the Analects, it is written that Confucius “did not eat rice that had gone sour or fish and meat that had spoiled. He did not eat food that had gone off colour or food that had a bad smell. He did not eat food that was not properly prepared, nor did he eat except at the proper times” (10.7). Such passages use Confucius as a model to convey rules about consumption and dining, illustrating a standard of moderation and the importance of dietary safety. The underlying message is that food and drinks should be consumed in moderation. When describing an exemplary or morally superior individual, the Analects notes that when drinking alcohol, Junzi people are able to hold their drink (9.16). As for Confucius, “even when there was plenty of meat, he avoided eating more meat than rice” and he “did not eat more than was proper” (10.8). The implication is that all human activities, including the most basic such as food consumption, are inseparable from the problems of value and consistency. So, by exercising righteous and proper behaviour, which involves practising constraint, can one come to an ideal state of zhonge (中和), which often translates to ‘equilibrium and harmony’. Once this is realised to the highest degree, it is believed Heaven and Earth “attain their proper order and all things will flourish’ (Chan, 1963, p. 98).
The need to exercise restraint when using the environment to attain resources and promote human prosperity is further discussed in the text Mengzi. Here it is stated that there was a time when the trees were luxuriant on the Ox Mountain but by being situated on the outskirts of a growing settlement, the trees were being constantly chopped down, so “Is it any wonder that they are no longer fine?” (Mencius 6A.8). Although this passage is used to compare the nature of humans as having a predisposition towards humanity and righteousness just as a lush mountain tends to restore itself over time, the description of the barren mountain as being the consequence of human activity shows that the early Confucians were aware of the impact that human settlement had on the environment. For Confucius, the way to avoid environmental destruction was to regulate such interaction. For instance, when fishing it was preferable to use a fishing line and not a cable with many lines attached to it, and when shooting birds to avoid shooting the roosting ones (Analects, 7.27). By not excessively extracting from the environment, the natural world would be able to recover and develop itself back to the ideal state of zhonge.
The theory that humans should dominate and conquer the natural world was never part of mainstream thinking in classical China. Despite this, the question remains as to how Confucian environmental principles can be put into practice in the modern world. More specifically, how should China, who claims to be an “ecological civilisation”, apply Confucian environmental ethics to its economic policies without harming the country’s growth? The third part of this sustainability series will provide a critical overview of China’s recent environmental projects and examine whether the application of Confucian principles is adequate to transform human-environment interaction.
The shape and meaning given to physical bodies constitutes the primary way that Western societies organize themselves socially. Although in Western thought, one may understand the body to be inessential compared to the importance placed on the rational, disembodied subject; physical bodies, as Nigerian feminist philosopher Oyeronke Oyewumi (1997) says, “are always social bodies” (p. xii). What she means by this phrase is that society in the West tends to be organized by a hierarchy that differentiates between the kind of bodies present so that biology is thought to equal social destiny. Difference from the standard male subject is expressed as degeneration or “a deviation from the original type” (p. 1) because women/females are defined as the Other: the antithesis to men/males who represent the norm. In this self/other distinction, which is central to Western metaphysics, there is a lack of space for women to articulate themselves as subjects. Luce Irigaray (1985), for example, stated that “I am a being sexualized as feminine” (p. 148) is not able to be articulated because women are socialized to accept the subordinate positions offered to them within patriarchal discourse.
A key aspect to this system of organization is the emphasis placed on Cartesian dualism or the mind/body difference, which categorically separates material and mental substances as two separate things. Certain valuational schemas are encouraged by this difference, namely, that the body, often linked to the female/maternal/natural, is thought to be inferior to reason and the mind, a domain that has been traditionally reserved for males. One outcome from such a schema is that gender becomes an oppressive hierarchical dichotomy in which women cannot be anything other than the material negative to the rational man (Coetzee & Halsema, 2018). Another outcome is that with the body devalued and associated with death and deception, patriarchy is cut off from nature so that the universe of language and symbols “has no roots in the flesh” (Irigaray, 1993, p. 16). With humans (man) sitting at the top of the natural hierarchy, nature and the environment have long been considered to be outside of moral consideration. The result has been an unsustainable relationship with nature as environmental destruction from Western-centric development policies are accepted as inevitable for the price of progress and modernity, even if this has meant excessive exploitation of natural resources, deforestation, the loss of biodiversity, freshwater shortages, and damage to the ozone layer.
Examples of Alternative Value Systems
For Confucian scholar Tu Wei-Ming (1992), the dialectic of Enlightenment that started with the celebration of rationality before moving to the Faustian drive to seek total dominion over nature and other human beings is what eventually led to our current situation, impelling us to “raise the agonizing question: Are human beings a viable species?” (p. 88). However, it should be noted that gender and body as a system based on division and hierarchy between man/reason and woman/nature is not a concept that is indigenous to many cultures and was generally imposed on societies through Western colonial rule. In Nigeria, for instance, bodily differences were not hierarchical in precolonial Yoruba culture (Oyewumi, 1997; Dogo, 2014). Instead of putting women in a single group characterized by shared interests, desires, and social positions, people were classified into social groups depending on the roles they chose and the kind of people they were. Thus, a subject in Yorubaland was not primarily thought of as a man or a woman, but rather a trader, hunter, cook, farmer, or ruler—all of which were equally accessible to every citizen. Oyewumi (2002) further describes the traditional Yoruba family as non-gendered since power within the family was diffused and not gender-specific. The main organizing principle within the family was seniority. Unlike sex, seniority as an organizing principle is context-dependent as “no one is permanently in a senior or junior position; it all depends on who is present in any given situation” (Oyewumi, 1997, p. 42). As a result, identity in Yoruba culture was understood as fluid, relational, contextual, and shifting. Seniority is only comprehensible as part of relationships and is not “rigidly fixated on the body nor dichotomized” (p. 42), whereas gender as it is featured in Western culture fixes power relations by confining certain categories of people (women) to limited roles and spaces.
Although there are many different interpretations concerning the status of women in China depending on which aspect of Chinese culture one is studying (see Ortner, 1974), the differentiation between reason and nature is not indigenous to the Chinese-world view. Without simplifying Chinese ideas of non-dualistic thinking and dynamic processes, Chinese cultural heritage has a lot to say about physical nature. For instance, self-cultivation as a form of mental and physical catering that involves exercises such as rhythmic bodily movements and breathing techniques in the form of Tai Chi is an ancient Chinese art form. Chinese medicine is also not only concerned with curing diseases and preventing sickness, but with restoring vital energy (qi) that is essential for maintaining the body in a healthy state. As Tu (1992) notes, because the level of qi required for each individual is dependent on sex, age, weight, height, occupation, time, and circumstances, the wholeness of the body is a situational and dynamic process rather than a static structure.
Values about undifferentiated wholeness and completeness are foundational to Chinese philosophy. On the surface, philosophy in China seems to be exclusively concerned with issues of correct behaviour, familial obedience, political order, and world peace, but as Wing-tsit Chan (1963) suggests, a more comprehensive characterization of Chinese philosophy and humanism is “not the humanism that denies or slights a Supreme Power, but one that professes the unity of man and Heaven” (p. 3). In contrast to Western humanism, which is based on secularism and devalues things that are associated with nature, the spiritual and naturalist dimensions in Chinese thought are incorporated into a comprehensive vision of the relationship between human beings and the natural world. Even the aesthetic components of music and dance that Confucius included in his curriculum are intimately linked with the ritualised aspect of human-nature relatedness. Kim (2006) highlights that the noble person (junzi) is one that is awakened to the beauty of humanness and the universe, and “it is because of this awareness that he ‘sets his mind on the Way [dao, 到], depends on virtue [de, 德], relies on ren [人] and enjoys the arts [you yu yi]’” (p. 111; Analects, 7.6).
Moreover, the Confucian and Daoist emphasis on spontaneity and living in harmony and natural ease is highlighted by both the life story of Confucius, who at seventy followed his heart’s desire without overstepping his bounds (Analects, 2.4), and the Daoist notion of following the Way. In chapter 25 of the Dao De Jing, it states that “Human follows the way of the earth; the earth follows the way of the heaven; the heaven follows Dao; Dao follows the way of nature” (translation by Wang, 2013, p. 70). Spontaneity and following the way of nature means to seek the growth of the whole and cultivate one’s relationship with animate and inanimate things. To do so is to maintain the underlying harmony that interfuses between man and man, and between man and things (Chang, 1963). For modern Confucianism, attempts to revitalise the tradition of human-nature relatedness can be seen through the concept of ‘heart-mind compassion’ (buren ren zhixin, 不忍人之 心) and ‘unity with all things under Heaven’ (yu wanwu yiti, 與萬物一體). Just like one’s responsibility towards filial relationships and society, humans are believed to have a moral duty to recognise the independent value of nourishing the Heaven and Earth in order to maintain nature, an essential component to living in a healthy human community. Thus, rather than domination, caring for ‘all things under Heaven’ is a moral demand that humans are required to respond to.
The Problem with ‘Sustainability’
However, applying these theories to contemporary life is difficult. The concept of ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable development’ is subject to many interpretations and takes on different meanings depending on the interest group and society involved. Traditionally, the definition provided by the United Nations, which states that sustainability is the ability to meet “the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”, is used without critically examining the meaning of ‘needs’. For instance, it is unclear if needs refer to maintaining quality harvests over time or improving human living standards in which case protecting natural resources and the environment is only part of the story. From an anthropological point of view, sustainability should concern maintaining social and cultural systems (aboriginal skills and knowledges) and applying these skills to solve real world problems.
Combining all of these under the term ‘intergenerational equity’, American lawyer Edith Brown Weiss (1989) argued that sustainability should be understood as a holistic term that involves the human species passing on the natural and cultural environment in an at least comparable condition to that in which it was received. But with short-term thinking that characterises political and development decision-making, there has been a widening gap between necessary measures to protect the natural and cultural environment and policy. International law has struggled to respond effectively as most environmental agreements either fall into non-binding declarations or preambles of multilateral environmental agreements. Governments like the United States have shown how easy it is for states to pull out of such agreements without any serious ramifications. Furthermore, the idea of passing on the current environment in ‘an at least comparable condition’ has been interpreted by some to mean that all that matters in the end is that the aggregate gains outweigh the aggregate losses. So, if a project generates more wealth than the monetary costs of environmental damage, then the project should be able to go ahead since the loss of the environmental is made up for by the wealth that is generated (Beder, 2000). For utilitarian philosopher David Pearce (1991), the equivalent of this principle in practice would be to allow the Amazon forest to be removed so long as the proceeds from removing it “are reinvested to build up some other form of capital” (p. 2).
These are not equitable solutions for local communities or the environment. Such ‘sustainable’ development policies are strongly influenced by economists of the neoclassical school and only reinforce existing inequalities. Robert Bullard (1993), professor of sociology at the University of California, claims that people of colour in the United States “are disproportionately affected by industrial toxins, dirty air and drinking water, and the location of noxious facilities” (p. 25) since polluting facilities are often placed in working class areas. Women and girls are also disproportionately impacted by climate change. By constituting two-thirds of the world’s poor, women are more reliant on natural resources which means that the scarcity of these resources makes it more difficult for women to support their families and communities. The estimation that in Africa alone, women walk forty billion hours a year to bring water home puts this considerable toll into perspective (Zoloth, 2017). Despite being disproportionately affected, government programs and financing mechanisms that are aimed at environmental sustainability are often not gender-informed. A 2012 assessment of the Climate Development Mechanism found that only five of 3,864 projects had gender considerations within their programming, which shows that there is a clear inconsistency between the ethic of sustainable development put forward by intergovernmental agreements, and the way that economists and policy-makers are achieving these goals.
Western religious and cultural discourses have been pointed to as a reason for current environmental problems. Oyewumi’s writings point out that the reason over nature hierarchy and the repression of the female/maternal is neither inevitable nor universal. The fact that development policies that are directed at environmental sustainability continue to negatively impact the lower class, women, and people of colour highlights that what is needed is a cross-continental dialogue between scholars and philosophers who can put forward alternative perspectives to Western culture’s oppositional logic in order to produce enriching and original insights. There is also a need to put these principles into action through enforceable policies by both communities and states. In part two of this article series, sustainability from a Confucian perspective will be discussed as well as a critical overview of China’s recent environmental projects.
In 2010, a UC Berkley event on Confucianism and Marxism was cosponsored by the Institute of East Asian Studies, the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies, and the Institute of European Studies. Speakers from Tsinghua University discussed Marxism and Confucianism as understood in China, historically and within the contemporary context. Marxism, which has been considered a central organizing philosophy by much of Eurasia until the late 20th century, was addressed by Berkeley respondents in a wide-ranging conversation on comparative theory and practice.