comparative study

Confucianism outside of China

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Part 6 of the 2018 interview with Dr. Alan Chan at Bond University, Australia. Countries such as Korea and Japan were historically under the cultural and political influence of China, which brought Confucianism to these countries. In this video, it is discussed whether Confucianism is just as important to the economic and social development of Asian countries outside of China.

On Human Nature- 人性

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Source: Mencius, The Three Moves. Anonymous drawing, China, 20th century. Photo by AKG Images.

The theory of human nature continues to be popularised in philosophical and biological debates. The nature of something refers to the idea that some traits are an expression of an animal’s inner essence, while other traits are developed because of the animal’s environment. For example, one may debate whether particular breeds of dogs are naturally aggressive or whether their environment necessitates that aggression is key to the dog’s survival. The phrase ‘human nature’ refers to something that all humans share universally. It assumes that there is an essential quality in human behaviour that makes humans distinctly human and not animal-like. In medieval scholarship, it was believed that thing that makes humans especially distinct is the existence of the soul– the first principle of life that is present in all of us. Although biological in that the soul makes up part of living organisms, the soul is not material or corporeal, but made of more ethereal properties (Pasnau, 2011). Descartes followed this line of thinking by making a distinction between the natural world, which simply involved bodies in motion, in comparison to the human world, where individuals were believed to possess an immortal soul. 

But what is this essential soul like? Is it kind and good-natured or, as Hobbes posited, are humans naturally self-centred and power-hungry? In the text The Fable of the BeesBernard Mandeville reinforced the negative view of human beings as innately selfish and unruly. Thus, it was the duty of law and education to civilise or domesticate humans and make them fit to exist in an ordered society. Discourses and systems of thought and knowledge had to be governed by rules, logic, and grammar that, if taught from an early age, would start shaping the consciousness of individuals. Such an approach could instil values of order in humans to help them control their inner urgers or bestial tendencies. While some people are more susceptible to slipping through the system and being overpowered by their nature, becoming victims of uncontrollable sexuality, insanity or criminality, throughdiscipline, punishment, and normalization techniques, bodies can be ordered and made easier to control (Foucault, 1975Gutting & Oksala, 2018). 

 In Chinese history, reflections on human nature (xing性) began to enter the literary tradition around the fifth and fourth centuries before Christ, during the conflict period in the Eastern Zhou dynasty that resulted in significant political, economic, and social changes throughout China. According to sinologist A. C. Graham (1967), it was the doctrines of the Individualists that first posed the problem of human nature when reflecting on the role of Heaven influencing people’s private lives. Unlike Confucius whose philosophy was aimed at creating optimal conditions for social harmony and coexistence, Individualists put emphasis on the necessity for people to take care of their health and body to maintain a good quality of life. According to the Lüshi chunqiu, the most important task is “to keep intact what Heaven has [granted]” (1.2), which includes maintaining one’s health, desires, and ambitions. To avoid disrupting Heaven and the natural flow of life. Individualists argued that humans should stick to their nature and seek to satisfy their desires and ambitions with moderation, and avoid involving themselves in any conditioning, such as political and social life, that could negatively impact the sereneness of achieving their life path. The idea here is that human nature is neither good nor bad, but the essence of humans is to achieve their goals and maintain that sense of tranquillity in life that comes from satisfying one’s desires.

In the first century, Chinese meteorologist, astronomer, and philosopher Wang Chong emphasized the goodness and badness of human beings. Human nature in his writings is described as being malleable since taking part in goodness will cultivate good human nature, while taking part in badness is what leads to evil human traits and behaviours (Lun heng, 1.13). Gaozi, who is only known from the Menciusand who Confucianists identified as a Daoist, disagreed with Wang Chong’s views. For Gaozi, the goodness and badness of people and morality itself is socially constructed and based on the culture that people exist in. For instance, some actions may be considered good and noble in culture X, whereas they are shunned and made taboo in culture Y. In this sense, human nature has nothing to do with being good or bad because we all initially have no conception of right and wrong before we are taught that goodness is what is praiseworthy and positive whereas badness is what should be punished. While Xunzi agreed with Gaozi in that he argued that morality is culture-based, Xunzi went further to state that the origins of evil come from negative feelings that are rooted in human nature. That is not to say that humans are evil, rather that they deliberately violate the rules of morality and sometimes even take pleasure in doing so. This is because people have no conception of morality. At birth, all humans are morally blind, and it is only later that we learn what we should do to exist in an ordered society. If people were inherently good, then there would be no need for people to learn rituals and social norms and keep their desires and impulses in check. Xunzi states that people desire order and goodness and since desire comes from a lack (we only desire what we do not have), then it follows that people are not inherently good. In fact, without learning the Way, feelings like fear, jealously, and greed would inevitably lead people into conflict and disorder.

Gaozi and Xunzi were heavily criticized by Mencius, who outlined various positive values that he believed were innate to human beings. Using an agricultural metaphor, Mencius stated that all humans have good tendencies or “sprouts” (2A6). If these sprouts are taught and cultivated, they would inevitably grow and give life to virtues and morality in society. However, if the sprouts failed to develop, then evil would manifest in human relations. In Mencius’s theory, one could take the example of benevolence as being a sprout. All humans, at least on some occasions, feel compassion when humans and animals suffer, and this compassion always has the potential to turn into benevolent action. All humans also have the capacity to feel shame, and these feelings are expressions of righteousness. But as with any seed or sprout, these good tendencies are not fully formed. Our innate virtues are inconsistent and context-dependent. For instance, a father who is kind to a pig and spares its life from slaughter may ignore the suffering of his own hungry family. To allow good human nature to flourish, people should extend their virtuous inclinations in appropriate situations (Van Norden, 2014). The father has a higher duty in Confucian philosophy to protect his family and ensure their survival and so benevolence for family would override benevolence for pig in this starvation scenario. Thus, though we are inclined towards goodness and humaneness, benevolence is not static and involves understanding the long-term implications of certain actions and the number of lives that could be impacted by these actions. Although a difficult calculation to make, Confucianists posit that it is essential to make these calculations and live in a harmonious social order. Therefore, whether humans are innately good or evil is beside the point. All of these perspectives put forward the idea that humans have the capacity for good and that this capacity should be acted upon since it is necessary for the survival of a polity or community to have rules and standards on right behaviour and social conduct. 

In Buddhist philosophy, although the Buddha never directly addressed the question of human nature, it was stated that humans have the capacity to do good and, in the right circumstances, will lean towards goodness. This is because the development of goodness conduces people to have a better and more happier life. In the Milinda Panha, a King was said to ask the Venerable sage Nagasena whether good or evil is greater. Nagasena replied that good is dominant and evil less so because doing evil leads to remorse, while doing good does not lead to remorse and when one is free from remorse, a person becomes glad, and from gladness joyful, and from joyful tranquil, and with a tranquil mind and body one can see things as they really are (passage 84). The clarity of this passage can be disputed. For example, what if one does not feel remorseful from doing something evil? Not all ‘bad’ actions cause people to feel remorse, especially if the person believes that what they are doing is a lesser evil or that such an evil is done with principled intentions (like avenging another person’s grievous wrongdoings, for instance). Likewise, some ‘good’ actions may not cause people to feel joy. Often, what one defines as good actions is dependent on the culture and context and may be conducted out of necessity and not out of good-willed intentions. 

Finally, one should also ask whether all human natures are the same. A 2006 psychological study by Harris and Fiske found that a small sample size of American university students exhibited less neural activity when they were shown pictures of homeless people or drug addicts compared to when they were shown higher-status individuals. Kteiley et al.’s study also highlighted that people who opposed Muslim immigration saw Muslims as less evolved. Perhaps then the debate on human nature should start with the proposition, what are humans’ naturesconsidering that there are many types of humans and contexts where good and bad inclinations can develop. Are all people whose sprouts fail to develop bad? What about those who are not aware (or even incapable of being aware) of the consequences of their actions? Also, how should we treat people with bad tendencies? Are we obliged to put them in correctional facilities or hide them from society? It seems that human nature is both socially constructed yet constructing, universal yet historically and culturally specific, and so there should be care when making overarching claims about human goodness or badness and what people should do when someone does not fit into the narrative of an ordered, good, and socially acceptable human.

Social Capital in Non-Confucian Asian Contexts: The Case of Laos -社会资本在非儒亚洲语境:老挝为例

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Laos

In the last ten years, a significant amount of literature has developed around the concept of ‘social capital’. Put simply, social capital refers to the social relations and shared norms that promote trust and cooperation between individuals and groups. The concept was first developed by the World Bank and the OECD through American political scientist Robert Putnam, who argued that high levels of social capital had a positive impact on well-being, health, educational performance, economic growth and security because the more a society cooperates, the easier it is for services to function and deliver political goods. On the other hand, the lack of social capital was believed to account for problems such as social inequalities, underdevelopment, and the level of delinquency and crime in some countries and neighbourhoods. In this way, the concept showed “some theoretical insights by identifying social capital with the building up of social connections and sociability… (through) goodwill, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse” (Castiglione et al., 2008, p. 2).

Although there is much debate over the different types of social capital, the literature tends to divide it into three main categories: first, bonds through links to people based on a common identity, including the nation, local community, and family. Second, through the links that one develops beyond your immediate relationships, for example to colleagues and associates. Finally, through links to people or groups who are prestigious and influential. By developing information channels through these links while following norms and social expectations, the social capital theory posits that people can become more socially and economically secure. In the United Kingdom, for instance, a government survey showed that more people gained jobs through personal contacts than through external job applications and advertisements. In places where the justice system is weak or dysfunctional, gangs and criminal organisations with high social capital are able to fund education for their members, find them work, and even temporarily provide for their family.

For Alejandro Portes (1998), the perceived benefits of social capital make it look like knowing the right people automatically translates into solving all of one’s social problems. His comments highlight that the term can be overused and misleading as there is often confusion over the meaning of social capital, and various presumptions of the social mechanisms that are used to explain it. But considering that humans are social animals that need community and contact to survive in an increasingly globalised world, it follows that establishing and maintaining relationships with people, groups, and organisations is essential. While social capital exists in all communities, Confucian cultures have particularly been found to emphasise the concept much more than in non-Confucian cultures (Carpenter, 2004). This is illustrated by concepts like guanxi in China, inmak in Korea, and joge kankei in Japan, all of which refer to social networks and socialization practices that facilitate business and other dealings. Local businesses in these countries often establish strong network ties in their domestic markets to stay competitive against international firms and to easily transfer technical knowledge and resources within borders. However, when it comes to non-Confucian Asian countries, the importance of social capital is less understood.

For Sorensen and Nielsen’s research, the case of Laos, a country that predominantly adheres to Theravada Buddhism, was an important contribution to expanding the general understanding of social capital in different Asian contexts. For instance, their initial analysis showed that in contrast to Confucian countries, the Lao language had no single word that accurately represented social capital. The most suitable word to refer to the concept was teun tang sangkhom, a direct translation of social capital that lacks any traditional definition or conceptualization rooted in the Lao language. This differs from the situation in China and Korea, where guanxi and inmak are recognised by mainstream society and thus consciously used by people to build and expand their businesses and employment opportunities. Because social capital is less defined and understood in Laos, people are less calculating in their use of social capital practices even though connecting to the right people and expanding one’s social networks is extensively used in Lao society. As one respondent in Sorensen and Nielsen’s study explained, for the people of Lao whose geostrategic location made the country vulnerable to colonialism and civil war, “The family union and secondary social connections have been their life source. Without it they could not”. Another respondent added that in Lao society, a person can be “completely lost without connections. No matter what you look at, if you haven’t got the connections it won’t happen”. The lack of strong legislative frameworks was also found by Gunawardana and Sisombat (2008) to contribute to an environment where social capital was used to accommodate lack of transparency with practices that increased the cost of doing business, such as informal red tape.

Just like in the neighbouring countries of Myanmar and Thailand, family and strong kinship connections were found to be the core of Laos’s bonding communities. As a collectivist society, the emphasis values such as trust and security were the main reasons why strong bonding through family has traditionally been the key support system for Lao society (Evans, 2013). For non-Lao people, it is possible to gain access to these bonding communities when groups choose to encompass looser relationships in business contexts, allowing stakeholders to join and over time become part of the stronger social capital networks. Sorensen and Nielsen confirmed that Lao people generally enjoyed meeting new people, which made it relatively easier for outsiders to gain access to bonding communities compared to places like China which places a greater emphasis on shared culture and identity than social capital development. In that case, consistency in engagement was seen to strengthen bonds and social capital in Laos and so developing a sense of humour, patience, and showing modesty were found to be highly regarded in Lao culture.

In China, the Confucian ruler-subject system and the communist principles of governance provided rules for a social order that was clearly defined by interpersonal relationships and obligations (see the “five human relations” of Confucianism in Dau-Lin, 1970). The absence of such a system explains why social capital, while existent and even essential in some cases, is less clearly defined in Theravada Buddhist Laos. For instance, while gift exchanges were used in China to symbolize respect, appreciation, and goodwill, the use of gifts was significantly less common in Laos as people often preferred getting straight to business, especially when strong bridging and bonding relationships were already in place. Sorensen and Nielsen’s research highlights that the use of social capital can be quite ambiguous yet just as important in non-Confucian contexts such as Laos. Further research should be done to expand these findings.

Can Confucians Have Friends? – 你能在儒家中拥有朋友吗?An article by Peter Adamsom*

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Confucius and Friends

One of the more arresting claims Aristotle makes in his famous exploration of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics is that you can’t be friends with god. His reasoning is that friendship requires equality, and the gods are vastly superior to us. The argument is a plausible one: it seems difficult or impossible to be friends with a boss, mentor, or teacher in quite the way that one is friends with one’s peers and equals. Indeed we might say that friendship is distinctive precisely in being non-hierarchical. If I am truly your friend, what I am to you is exactly what you are to me.

This thought has been supposed to cause trouble for the followers of Confucius. Confucianism was China’s most influential philosophical tradition for well over two millennia. Its ethical teaching has at its center several hierarchical relationships that were intrinsically bound up with forms of propriety, including rituals. The second most famous Confucian thinker Mencius (372-289 BC) identifies five ‘cardinal relations’, four of which are clearly hierarchical: ruler and subject, father and son, old and young, and husband and wife (Aristotle too sees the latter as an unequal relationship). The odd relationship out is friendship. Friendship seems to fit badly with the Confucian idea of modeling human relationships on family bonds. One possible comparison, which sees friends as having a bond like that between older and younger brother, would not secure the symmetry we’re looking for. Friendship is also anomalous among the cardinal relations in lacking ritual prescriptions, and in being voluntary. You don’t choose your father or (at least in ancient China) your ruler, but you do choose your friends.

Confucius (551-479 BC) would also have had some reason to think that friendships should be unequal. For him the purpose of friendship is the cultivation of virtue. It seems a natural thought that we should therefore befriend those more excellent than us, so as to learn from them. Yet like Aristotle, Confucius insists on symmetry in true friendship, advising, “do not have as a friend anyone who is not as good as you are.”

It’s been argued that in light of this latter rule, Confucius himself could never have made friends at all. His disciples were certainly dear to him, as we see from a passage in his Analects, when he openly grieves for one of them who has died. But does that mean he was this disciple’s friend? David Hall and Roger Ames would say not. In their book Thinking Through Confucius, they asserted, “Confucius is peerless and hence, friendless. To assert that Confucius had friends would diminish him.” His relation with his students was arguably more akin to a hierarchical, familial one, as shown by the fact that he referred to them as his xiaozi, meaning ‘little masters’, or ‘sons’.

In keeping with the equality of friendship, Confucius identifies trust (xin) as its distinctive attitude, whereas a familial relationship would be characterized by an asymmetrical virtue such as filial piety (xiao). Confucius would thus discourage parents from trying to befriend their children, a common trend in modern-day family life. Just as a father cannot be the teacher of his son because their relation is too intimate, so being overly familiar is no way to be familial.

But how exactly do I cultivate excellence by befriending someone who is equal to me? After all it would seem that I have nothing to learn from my moral peer, at least not in the way Confucius describes in this passage from the Analects: “in strolling in the company of just two other persons, I am bound to find a teacher. Identifying their strengths, I follow them, and identifying their weaknesses, I reform myself accordingly.” Instead, it must somehow be that sharing with equal others in the excellent moral life, or at least in the pursuit of virtue, is itself a spur to the good life, or even a constitutive part of it.

Confucius seems to have been convinced that this is so. For one thing, no less than other relationships, friendship gives us an opportunity to exercise virtue. Confucius himself aimed “to bring peace to the old, to have trust in my friends, and to cherish the young,” and in advising us on examining our own character he speaks of reflecting on whether we have always kept our word with our friends. Friendship is also a source of delight, as is made clear in this line from the opening passage of the Analects: “to have friends [peng] come from distant quarters: is this not a source of enjoyment?” Yanguo He informs us that the word peng has a strong implication of ‘like-mindedness’, and may especially indicate the bonds between the students gathered around one master.

This is a hint towards a deeper importance of friends, namely that they are embarked with us upon a joint project of self-cultivation. We do not improve morally by looking to friends as a model for imitation, as we might with a superior. Rather, our affection for them is based on a recognition that they share with us our greatest pursuit. To illustrate this idea, the scholar Xiufen Lu gave the example of the tale of Bo Ya, a musician whose mastery was fully appreciated only by his friend Zhong Ziqi. When Zhong died, Bo Ya smashed his instrument, on the grounds that playing without being understood is pointless.

Likewise, Confucius occasionally complained about being unappreciated by the morally inept. This may come as a surprise, but is simply the counterpart of the joy he took in associating with those who shared his values. Birds of a feather really do flock together, ideally by taking wing towards the heights of virtue.

© Prof. Peter Adamson 2018

Peter Adamson is the author of A History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps, Vols 1, 2 & 3, available from OUP. They’re based on his popular History of Philosophy podcast.

*This original article can be found here.

Social Organization and Sustainability: Part One- 社会组织与可持续性

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The shape and meaning given to physical bodies constitutes the primary way that Western societies organize themselves socially. Although in Western thought, one may understand the body to be inessential compared to the importance placed on the rational, disembodied subject; physical bodies, as Nigerian feminist philosopher Oyeronke Oyewumi (1997) says, “are always social bodies” (p. xii). What she means by this phrase is that society in the West tends to be organized by a hierarchy that differentiates between the kind of bodies present so that biology is thought to equal social destiny. Difference from the standard male subject is expressed as degeneration or “a deviation from the original type” (p. 1) because women/females are defined as the Other: the antithesis to men/males who represent the norm. In this self/other distinction, which is central to Western metaphysics, there is a lack of space for women to articulate themselves as subjects. Luce Irigaray (1985), for example, stated that “I am a being sexualized as feminine” (p. 148) is not able to be articulated because women are socialized to accept the subordinate positions offered to them within patriarchal discourse.

A key aspect to this system of organization is the emphasis placed on Cartesian dualism or the mind/body difference, which categorically separates material and mental substances as two separate things. Certain valuational schemas are encouraged by this difference, namely, that the body, often linked to the female/maternal/natural, is thought to be inferior to reason and the mind, a domain that has been traditionally reserved for males. One outcome from such a schema is that gender becomes an oppressive hierarchical dichotomy in which women cannot be anything other than the material negative to the rational man (Coetzee & Halsema, 2018). Another outcome is that with the body devalued and associated with death and deception, patriarchy is cut off from nature so that the universe of language and symbols “has no roots in the flesh” (Irigaray, 1993, p. 16). With humans (man) sitting at the top of the natural hierarchy, nature and the environment have long been considered to be outside of moral consideration. The result has been an unsustainable relationship with nature as environmental destruction from Western-centric development policies are accepted as inevitable for the price of progress and modernity, even if this has meant excessive exploitation of natural resources, deforestation, the loss of biodiversity, freshwater shortages, and damage to the ozone layer.

Examples of Alternative Value Systems

 For Confucian scholar Tu Wei-Ming (1992), the dialectic of Enlightenment that started with the celebration of rationality before moving to the Faustian drive to seek total dominion over nature and other human beings is what eventually led to our current situation, impelling us to “raise the agonizing question: Are human beings a viable species?” (p. 88). However, it should be noted that gender and body as a system based on division and hierarchy between man/reason and woman/nature is not a concept that is indigenous to many cultures and was generally imposed on societies through Western colonial rule. In Nigeria, for instance, bodily differences were not hierarchical in precolonial Yoruba culture (Oyewumi, 1997; Dogo, 2014). Instead of putting women in a single group characterized by shared interests, desires, and social positions, people were classified into social groups depending on the roles they chose and the kind of people they were. Thus, a subject in Yorubaland was not primarily thought of as a man or a woman, but rather a trader, hunter, cook, farmer, or ruler—all of which were equally accessible to every citizen. Oyewumi (2002) further describes the traditional Yoruba family as non-gendered since power within the family was diffused and not gender-specific. The main organizing principle within the family was seniority. Unlike sex, seniority as an organizing principle is context-dependent as “no one is permanently in a senior or junior position; it all depends on who is present in any given situation” (Oyewumi, 1997, p. 42). As a result, identity in Yoruba culture was understood as fluid, relational, contextual, and shifting. Seniority is only comprehensible as part of relationships and is not “rigidly fixated on the body nor dichotomized” (p. 42), whereas gender as it is featured in Western culture fixes power relations by confining certain categories of people (women) to limited roles and spaces.

Although there are many different interpretations concerning the status of women in China depending on which aspect of Chinese culture one is studying (see Ortner, 1974), the differentiation between reason and nature is not indigenous to the Chinese-world view. Without simplifying Chinese ideas of non-dualistic thinking and dynamic processes, Chinese cultural heritage has a lot to say about physical nature. For instance, self-cultivation as a form of mental and physical catering that involves exercises such as rhythmic bodily movements and breathing techniques in the form of Tai Chi is an ancient Chinese art form. Chinese medicine is also not only concerned with curing diseases and preventing sickness, but with restoring vital energy (qi) that is essential for maintaining the body in a healthy state. As Tu (1992) notes, because the level of qi required for each individual is dependent on sex, age, weight, height, occupation, time, and circumstances, the wholeness of the body is a situational and dynamic process rather than a static structure.

Values about undifferentiated wholeness and completeness are foundational to Chinese philosophy. On the surface, philosophy in China seems to be exclusively concerned with issues of correct behaviour, familial obedience, political order, and world peace, but as Wing-tsit Chan (1963) suggests, a more comprehensive characterization of Chinese philosophy and humanism is “not the humanism that denies or slights a Supreme Power, but one that professes the unity of man and Heaven” (p. 3). In contrast to Western humanism, which is based on secularism and devalues things that are associated with nature, the spiritual and naturalist dimensions in Chinese thought are incorporated into a comprehensive vision of the relationship between human beings and the natural world. Even the aesthetic components of music and dance that Confucius included in his curriculum are intimately linked with the ritualised aspect of human-nature relatedness. Kim (2006) highlights that the noble person (junzi) is one that is awakened to the beauty of humanness and the universe, and “it is because of this awareness that he ‘sets his mind on the Way [dao, 到], depends on virtue [de, 德], relies on ren [人] and enjoys the arts [you yu yi]’” (p. 111; Analects, 7.6).

Moreover, the Confucian and Daoist emphasis on spontaneity and living in harmony and natural ease is highlighted by both the life story of Confucius, who at seventy followed his heart’s desire without overstepping his bounds (Analects, 2.4), and the Daoist notion of following the Way. In chapter 25 of the Dao De Jing, it states that “Human follows the way of the earth; the earth follows the way of the heaven; the heaven follows Dao; Dao follows the way of nature” (translation by Wang, 2013, p. 70). Spontaneity and following the way of nature means to seek the growth of the whole and cultivate one’s relationship with animate and inanimate things. To do so is to maintain the underlying harmony that interfuses between man and man, and between man and things (Chang, 1963). For modern Confucianism, attempts to revitalise the tradition of human-nature relatedness can be seen through the concept of ‘heart-mind compassion’ (buren ren zhixin, 不忍人之 心) and ‘unity with all things under Heaven’ (yu wanwu yiti, 與萬物一體). Just like one’s responsibility towards filial relationships and society, humans are believed to have a moral duty to recognise the independent value of nourishing the Heaven and Earth in order to maintain nature, an essential component to living in a healthy human community. Thus, rather than domination, caring for ‘all things under Heaven’ is a moral demand that humans are required to respond to.

The Problem with ‘Sustainability’

 However, applying these theories to contemporary life is difficult. The concept of ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable development’ is subject to many interpretations and takes on different meanings depending on the interest group and society involved. Traditionally, the definition provided by the United Nations, which states that sustainability is the ability to meet “the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”, is used without critically examining the meaning of ‘needs’. For instance, it is unclear if needs refer to maintaining quality harvests over time or improving human living standards in which case protecting natural resources and the environment is only part of the story. From an anthropological point of view, sustainability should concern maintaining social and cultural systems (aboriginal skills and knowledges) and applying these skills to solve real world problems.

Combining all of these under the term ‘intergenerational equity’, American lawyer Edith Brown Weiss (1989) argued that sustainability should be understood as a holistic term that involves the human species passing on the natural and cultural environment in an at least comparable condition to that in which it was received. But with short-term thinking that characterises political and development decision-making, there has been a widening gap between necessary measures to protect the natural and cultural environment and policy. International law has struggled to respond effectively as most environmental agreements either fall into non-binding declarations or preambles of multilateral environmental agreements. Governments like the United States have shown how easy it is for states to pull out of such agreements without any serious ramifications. Furthermore, the idea of passing on the current environment in ‘an at least comparable condition’ has been interpreted by some to mean that all that matters in the end is that the aggregate gains outweigh the aggregate losses. So, if a project generates more wealth than the monetary costs of environmental damage, then the project should be able to go ahead since the loss of the environmental is made up for by the wealth that is generated (Beder, 2000). For utilitarian philosopher David Pearce (1991), the equivalent of this principle in practice would be to allow the Amazon forest to be removed so long as the proceeds from removing it “are reinvested to build up some other form of capital” (p. 2).

These are not equitable solutions for local communities or the environment. Such ‘sustainable’ development policies are strongly influenced by economists of the neoclassical school and only reinforce existing inequalities. Robert Bullard (1993), professor of sociology at the University of California, claims that people of colour in the United States “are disproportionately affected by industrial toxins, dirty air and drinking water, and the location of noxious facilities” (p. 25) since polluting facilities are often placed in working class areas. Women and girls are also disproportionately impacted by climate change. By constituting two-thirds of the world’s poor, women are more reliant on natural resources which means that the scarcity of these resources makes it more difficult for women to support their families and communities. The estimation that in Africa alone, women walk forty billion hours a year to bring water home puts this considerable toll into perspective (Zoloth, 2017). Despite being disproportionately affected, government programs and financing mechanisms that are aimed at environmental sustainability are often not gender-informed. A 2012 assessment of the Climate Development Mechanism found that only five of 3,864 projects had gender considerations within their programming, which shows that there is a clear inconsistency between the ethic of sustainable development put forward by intergovernmental agreements, and the way that economists and policy-makers are achieving these goals.

Western religious and cultural discourses have been pointed to as a reason for current environmental problems. Oyewumi’s writings point out that the reason over nature hierarchy and the repression of the female/maternal is neither inevitable nor universal. The fact that development policies that are directed at environmental sustainability continue to negatively impact the lower class, women, and people of colour highlights that what is needed is a cross-continental dialogue between scholars and philosophers who can put forward alternative perspectives to Western culture’s oppositional logic in order to produce enriching and original insights. There is also a need to put these principles into action through enforceable policies by both communities and states. In part two of this article series, sustainability from a Confucian perspective will be discussed as well as a critical overview of China’s recent environmental projects.

 

The (In)Compatibility of Confucianism and Feminist Ethics- 儒家思想与女性主义伦理的(无)兼容性

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Confucian feminism

Yin-yang is an ancient Chinese philosophical construct of two polar complements. The yin-yang binary are neither forces nor material entities and are not intended to represent human relations. Rather, they are labels used to explain how phenomena function and change in relation to each other and the universe (Kaptchuck, 2014). As a way of thinking, yin-yang indicates that no entities can exist in isolation from each other: every entity is connected through its relationships with other entities where it transforms and stands in a contrary yet interdependent state.

In Chinese traditions, this is used to explain how time is divided into day and night; place (and function) into heaven and earth; and species into female and male categories. For associate professor Sung Hyun Yun (2012) however, the application of Yin to female and Yang to male was only later added in the second century BCE under the influence of Confucianism, which led to the institutionalisation of hierarchical gender relations in Chinese society. As Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee, author of the book ‘Confucianism and Women’ (2006), states, the yang and yin are explicitly correlated within Confucianism’s hierarchical schema “where tian (heaven)/yang/nan (man) are privileged over di (earth)/yin/nu (woman)” (p. 55). The problem with this is that if men are assigned priority and privilege in society because they are associated with the positive yang in the yin-yang dualism, they are granted access to a kind of power denied to women. This not only gives men unearned entitlements, which refers to things that all people should have such as feeling safe in public spaces, but also grants men the ability to dominate groups that belong to the opposing yin category.

The assignment of power and privilege is seen throughout many classical Chinese texts. For instance, in The Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu) it states:

“All things end and begin by following yang. The rectitude of the Three Kings rose to its utmost in following yang. In this way it can be seen that they esteemed yang and demeaned yin…Men, however mean, are in all cases yang; women, however hobble, are all yin…Categories of evil all are yin, whereas categories of good all are yang; yang is matter of virtue, yin is a matter of punishment” (Italics added, cited in Raphals, 1998, p. 163).

The categorisation listed here is quite similar to the problematic way gender is theorised about in the West, where women are associated with devalued terms in the hierarchy between mind/body, culture/nature and reason/emotion. The association of women to bodily features, nature, and irrationality has been used to marginalise and exclude women from the public sphere, restricting their access to positions of power, decision-making, and economic autonomy.

In China these distinctions were also used to keep women in the domestic sphere, limiting their abilities to contribute to society. Because a family’s prosperity and survival was dependent on men, infant boys were given value over girls. The Book of Odes (Shijing) notes that when a son is born, he is cradled on the bed, properly clothed and it is announced that “he shall be the lord of a hereditary house”. In contrast, a daughter is only cradled on the floor, wears no badges of honour, and it is hoped that she “shall only take care of food and drink, and not cause trouble to her parents” (no. 189). As a valued text, such passages reaffirm male power and agency and maintain unequal power relations by prescribing women to remain obedient and subordinate.

The classic Confucian text Nusishu (Four Books of Women) is considered a standard text that was compiled during the mid-Qing dynasty. The teachings in the book were used to educate how men and women should behave in feudal society. Chapter titles that discuss women, such as ‘Humble Yielding’, ‘Bending in Submission’, ‘Serving the Husband’, and ‘Being faithful to the Dead’ highlight that women in a male-centred ideology are encouraged to keep in line by restraining themselves. By restricting thought and action and maintaining the status quo, a woman gains greater status and becomes humble, devoted, and faithful in the eyes of her community. To keep such a system functioning, women who refuse the role of dutiful daughter or subordinate wife are threatened to be cast out of the family home. As Chan (1970) notes:

During the Sung Dynasty, “Chinese intellectuals preached extreme chastity, confining all women to their homes. Remarriage for a widow was tantamount to public disgrace. Hence, the States ordered tight binding for all women to hamper their movements and prevent possibility of unchaste wandering.” (p. 231)

It should be noted that Confucian philosophy was created by ministers and noblemen. While advocating for harmonious relations, righteousness, and altruism, these virtues were meant to guide ministers to conduct fair governance. When it came to women, Confucianism was responsible for reinforcing gender oppression by punishing disobedient women through social ostracism and keeping women in their place by binding their feet (though foot-binding was a practice introduced after the time of Confucius).

Although practices such as foot-binding have discontinued, Confucian norms such as respect for authority, hierarchy, family dependence, and the historical preference for sons have maintained many traditions in place. Due to the cultural stigma of having female children, for example, the former one-child policy in China led to millions of female infants being aborted, abandoned, or killed (Wall, 2013). In her research on Asian immigrant and refugee families, Yun (2012) shows that social problems remain prevalent. Surveys conducted on Asian immigrant families reveal that many male respondents from countries such as Cambodia, Vietnam, and China still believe that women have no right to a divorce and should be shamed if they leave their families; that the husband is the ruler of the household and has the right to discipline his wife; and that if experiencing marital problems, women should ‘talk softly’ and/or ‘do nothing’ (D’Avanzo et al., 1994; Yoshioka et al., 2009).

Despite the history of oppression behind Confucianism and the patriarchal norms that continue to exist in Confucian societies, some scholars have suggested that a ‘Confucian feminism’ is possible. For example, professor of philosophy Chenyang Li (1994) argues that the humanistic concept of Confucianism, namely the concept of ren as benevolence, altruism, kindness, and compassion can be separated from its historical context and compared to feminist ethicist Carol Gilligan’s ‘care ethics’. In care ethics, care and justice intersect with the development of a language that is focused on relationships and responsibilities. The ethics of care is about considering different types of relationships and roles in order to care in an appropriate and effective way. For Li, Confucianism is comparable with care ethics as it is based on non-contractual (non-legally binding) relationships and love for others according to their social roles and positions. Like care ethics, Confucianism seeks to create harmony in relationships; to preserve the obligation of care if one’s ability to provide care for others is not strained or exhausted; and to maintain networks of care that start from the family and build outward to form reciprocal contracts in the community.

However, this interpretation can be considered problematic. Associate professor of philosophy Daniel Star (2002) claims that Confucian ethics are role-based ethics that are in the concept of li or the rules of propriety. Although one may argue that new roles for women can be made that are not based on hierarchical male-centred relationships, roles can only ever be understood within a certain context that is inherited from the past. Confucianism cannot simply be stripped from its familial and hierarchical norms as this would mean doing away with the fundamental social relationships of father and son, lord and retainer, and husband and wife. A Confucianism without the values of chastity, filial piety, and loyalty is difficult to imagine since ren without filial piety or an organised family structure would be reduced to simple affection for significant others.

Confucianism is an ethics based on role relationships that are focused on men: a man of ren (junzi or exemplary person) has a greater ability to care for others than a petty man (xiaoren). Just as a father cares for his wife and children, a ruler is expected to care for his subjects. Although women are expected to take on caring roles also, women’s caring has never extended outside of family and marital relations: “firstly to their fathers, secondly their husbands, and thirdly their sons” (Kim, 2017, p. 6). The difference with care ethics is that Gilligan wrote about individual needs and not about normative principles of the past that define correct social roles. Whereas Confucianism is an ethics of men where righteous men take on care roles, feminist ethics of care requires that women are considered as moral subjects that are recognised for their perceived ability to care. Women in this respect do not care because they must care according to their social roles, but because they want to care with their rights and needs taken into account.

What this means is that for Confucianism to be compatible with feminist ethics, the philosophy must extend itself to incorporate notions such as equality, fairness, and individuality. Undoing the hierarchies that keep women deprived from the opportunity of becoming moral agents in their own right, where women can exist and be valued outside the family, is crucial to liberate women from particular forms of oppression. A return to the original conception of yin-yang is one where women and men belong to both sides of the binary to make up a dynamic duality that is based on dialectic and recognition. The question is, how far can such reform go without doing away with key components of Confucian philosophy?

Confucianism and Critical Rationalism- 儒学与理性主义

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Source: Foreign Policy (2014).

Although Confucius describes himself as a preserver of culture and places significant emphasis on the importance of learning, since learning and devotion for sons are considered key aspects to maintaining the dao (道 – a teaching or skill formula that is key to achieving self-perfection and world transformation), there is no discussion on rationality or logical reasoning in any of the Confucian texts. Commentator A. C. Graham has noted that along with the absence of a theory of reasoning, Confucius generally puts a low premium on thinking when compared to learning. In the modern world, the relationship between thinking and learning are often associated with one another: to learn any new theory or concept, one has to be able to think. That is, to acquire knowledge by discussing, comparing, and contrasting to test how and whether the new information fits in line with already established theories and concepts. The difference between thinking and learning, Graham argues, occurs when we define learning as that involving acquiring knowledge by committing something to memory and being able to recite it when needed, whereas thinking is the act of questioning, testing, and criticising information before accepting it as acquired knowledge.

For Chi-Ming (2017), the Confucian emphasis on hierarchy and harmony in contrast to critical thinking and rationalism has promoted submission and conformity in Chinese society. A review of recent psychological research indicates that people in China are dominated by authority-minded ways of thinking, which means that they are more willing to accept people at a senior level as arbiters of truth or morality and are likely to adopt non-confrontational approaches to conflict resolution (Shi & Feng, 2010; Ng, 2010). As Hall and Ames (1995) put it, one would not expect to read in the works of a classical Chinese [Confucian] scholar anything like Aristotle’s statement, “I love my teacher, Plato, but I love truth more”, for such a declaration would be seen as a form of self-assertiveness which has the potential to threaten social harmony. This raises questions as to whether Confucianism is inherently opposed to critical rationalism or, as some scholars put forward, it entails it.

What is critical rationalism?

 Austrian-British philosopher and professor Karl Popper (1966) put forward a formula for defining critical rationalism as listening to critical arguments and learning from one’s mistakes. This involves admitting that you may be wrong, and that the other person may be right, and with effort to investigate, taking part in inquiry to get nearer to the truth by distinguishing between falsity and reality. Popper considers criticism, or the act of refuting evidence by testing information for contradictions and discrepancies, to be an important part of learning from one’s mistakes and getting nearer to the truth. Without it, one can fall into the trap of defending a mistaken belief and appealing to unsound arguments.

For example, accepting an argument simply because it is advanced by those in authority is erroneous as these arguments may not be related to the truth, or may be advanced by people who claim that they are authorities when they are not. By this standard, it is unacceptable if a teacher is mistaken in making the claim that Australia is part of Africa and the students unquestionably accept the teacher’s claim because he is in a position of authority. Likewise, pro athletes pushing for home loans are likely false authorities as consumers do not know if the athletes have used or use home loans at all, and it can be assumed that the athlete was successful without using the product in the first place. The importance of criticism here comes from the fact that power is inextricably linked to knowledge. Michel Foucault (1977) pointed out that throughout history, knowledge was intertwined with forms of power and domination. Those in power have the resources and influence to determine what is accepted knowledge to justify their positions of authority. In many cases, statements can be dismissed and not even considered not because they are thought to be false, but because it is not clear for those in power what it would mean for those statements to be considered true or false. One only has to look at the example of Galileo discovering that the earth revolves around the sun, and the Vatican’s response that saw him sentenced to indefinite imprisonment until his death in 1642, to see how power and knowledge interacted to restrict scientific discovery.

Although people in positions of authority can help make sense of vast and complex theories and evidence, as courtrooms continue to rely on psychologists and forensic authorities in trials, the perspectives put forward by these professionals should be taken as resources for understanding information, rather than as a final say on debated issues. Criticism, in this sense, can also be used to defend against the fallacy of democracy, which claims that popular ideas are necessarily right, and dogmatism, where one may be unwilling to consider an opponent’s argument because of the assumption that those who disagree with you are biased, while your beliefs remain objective and correct.

Critical rationalism has significant implications for politics and education. Politically, it is a rejection of authoritarianism and any form of governance that rejects freedom of thought and critical inquiry. The key concepts here are rational and reflective, since both suggest going beyond mere acceptance of what others say one should believe. It necessarily requires opposition and alternative viewpoints and is supportive of citizen engagement. In education, critical thinking is about developing intellectual and moral virtues, including epistemic humility (recognition that one’s views may be incorrect), sincerity in the formation of belief, open-mindedness, fairness, and autonomy in reasoning (see Kim, 2003). Without these aspects, reasoning can be easily distorted to support unwarranted conclusions.

How critical rationalism differs from Confucianism

 If Confucianism values learning and not thinking (and if the two can be implicitly contrasted as suggested), then it follows that Confucius’ philosophy is at odds with contemporary education and critical rationalism. Learning without thinking is likely to involve processes of blind accumulation of information and the memorization and retention of ideas. Without inquiry, this is likely to lead to the acceptance of false ideas, prejudice, and ideology that serves those in power. In chapter 1, book VII of the Analects, Confucius states that he is only a transmitter rather than an innovator, looking to antiquity to solve the problems of his day. The idea is that knowledge is accumulated from watching, listening to, and reading from past ideas that are believed to hold ancient wisdom that can be adapted and applied. Though Confucianism highlights specific virtues that should be transmitted, without thorough knowledge of past information and its contexts, the past can be simply accepted because it comes from unquestionable authority, making criticism impossible.

Furthermore, whereas critical rationalism seeks to establish democracy and rule of law, Confucianism does not necessarily uphold either a democratic society nor protect the freedom of people. The Confucian idea about the effectiveness of teaching and learning, as revealed in The Documents (Shang shu 尚書), which states that everyone can become a Yao, Shun or Yu (all are legendary model rulers in ancient China), reflects a preference towards the power of education over rationalism, and the development of an undemocratic government that is based on filiality, benevolence, and the ruling class. While critical rationalism argues that criticism is the best means of establishing truth, for Confucianism, criticism is at best seen as an effective way of realizing benevolence, which is considered the ultimate goal of learning and achieving harmony. The outcome of critical discussion here is not aimed towards truth, but stimulating conversation that leads to moral effectiveness, which requires one to always be loyal and trustworthy in discourse (Knoblock & Zhang, 1999).

 The view that Confucianism entails critical thinking

For many Confucian scholars, the discovery of things as a form of thinking and learning can be compatible with Confucius’ admiration of antiquity and does not necessarily involve uncritically accepting and holding on to past knowledge. Despite the many differences between the two schools of thought, Confucianism and critical rationalism do share some significant similarities in theory. For instance, in line with critical rationalist values, Confucianism values epistemic modesty, courtesy to opponents, and respect for critical inquiry, although forbidden subjects and tabooed names are not to be discussed (Knoblock & Zhang, 1999). The Xunzi states that problems should be solved by rational and impartial inquiry rather than with emotions since desires and aversions are considered to be flaws of the mind’s operation.

It should be noted that while the Confucian tendency to draw from the past is often criticised as being conservative, it can also be an effective way of establishing critical thought. An emphasis on the past reflects a concern for continuity that can be used to shape the future instead of seeking to retain the past unchanged. In Book III, Chapter 14 of the Analects, Confucius says that the Zhou dynasty was built on the successes of two previous ruling dynasties: “How splendid was its pattern! And we follow the Zhou.” The past is seen as a useful resource for teaching moral lessons, and any change should be enacted by reflecting on previous practices and traditions. Rather than attack all forms of old thought, as was done under Chairman Mao during the Cultural Revolution, critical thinking can align with examining past approaches.

Finally, a key aspect of Confucian living that resembles critical rationalism is the importance of communication in rational discussion. The concept of wisdom (zhi, 智) in Confucianism is associated with thinking and is linked to inquiry. The character 智 indicates not only the ‘mouth’ (kou, 口) and ‘saying’ (yue 曰), which highlights the importance of communication in accumulating knowledge, but also that of the ‘arrow’ (shi 矢), which is made up of the characters for ‘people’ (ren 人), suggesting that wisdom entails a community of inquirers instead of knowing on one’s own (Ames, 2011). The idea is that learning and thinking is a social process and while thinking can take place on one’s own, self-reflection is only one aspect of learning from one’s mistakes and getting nearer to the truth. In the Analects Book VI, chapter 27, Confucius notes that once a cultivated person studies broadly in patterns in line with li, “he will never turn his back on them”, which demonstrates that practising li involves promoting social communication and order to achieve truth, rationalism, and harmony.

Although Confucianism does not align perfectly with Popper’s modern conception of critical rationalism, the two schools of thought are not completely in opposition. Without dismissing the claims put forward by Hall and Ames (1987), which state that Confucianism prioritizes aesthetic over logical ordering, and the emphasis on harmony reinforces affirmative versus critical thinking, the importance of wisdom in Confucianism, which involves conversing in an open-minded and logical manner, along with communicative critical discussion can be seen as aspects of the philosophy that promote a non-quarrelsome, studiousness, and impartial approach to inquiry. Taking Confucius’ lesson of learning from the past, Confucian ideology itself can be used in the present by negotiating what aspects of the philosophy align with modern values over those that do not. For some, such an approach is the only way to apply Confucian philosophy to solve contemporary problems, while for others using Confucian texts in different contexts to support arguments that may have not been relevant during Confucius’ time reveals the plurality and imprecision of meaning in interpreting ancient philosophy. Whether Confucian philosophy promotes or runs counter to critical rationalism is therefore dependent on how the reader chooses to interpret Confucian texts.